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2017 National Environmental Law Moot Court
Competition Problem*
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE TWELFTH CIRCUIT
September Term, 2016
Docket No. 16-0933
CORDELIA LEAR,
Plaintiff–Appellee–Cross Appellant,
v.
UNITED STATES FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE,
Defendant–Appellant–Cross Appellee,
and
BRITTAIN COUNTY, NEW UNION,
Defendant–Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
District of New Union in No. 112-CV-2015-RNR, Judge
Romulus N. Remus

Grayed out text denotes a change from the original Problem in response to official
Competition Q&A period.
*
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ORDER
Following the issuance of an Order of the United States District Court for the District of New Union dated June 1, 2016 in 112CV-2015-RNR, the United States Fish and Wildlife Service
(“FWS”) and Brittain County, New Union each filed a Notice of Appeal on June 9, 2016. Thereafter, Cordelia Lear filed a Notice of
Appeal on June 10, 2016.
Lear takes issue with the district court’s determination that
the Endangered Species Act (“ESA”), 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1544
(2012), is a legitimate exercise of congressional power under Article I, Section 8, Clause 3 of the U.S. Constitution, as applied to a
wholly intrastate population of Karner Blue Butterfly.
FWS takes issue with the district court’s decision with respect
to its holding: that Lear’s claim for an uncompensated taking under the Fifth Amendment was ripe since Lear did not apply for an
Incidental Take Permit (“ITP”) contemplated by ESA § 10, 16
U.S.C. § 1539(a)(1)(B); that the relevant parcel for the purpose of
Lear’s takings claim based upon complete deprivation of economic
value under Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S.
1003 (1992) is the Cordelia Lot as subdivided in 1965 and not the
entirety of Lear Island; that the potential future natural destruction of the Cordelia Lot’s lupine fields, which are the butterflies’ habitat, does not preclude Lear’s takings claim; that the Brittain
County Butterfly Society’s offer to pay $1,000 annually as rent for
wildlife viewing did not preclude Lear’s takings claim based upon
complete deprivation of economic value; that the public trust principles inherent in Lear’s title do not preclude her takings claim; and
that the ESA as administered by FWS and a Brittain County, New
Union Wetlands Preservation Law combine to deprive the Cordelia
Lot of all economic value.
Brittain County agrees with FWS regarding all aspects of Lear’s
takings claim, but agrees with Lear that the ESA is unconstitutional
as applied to the wholly intrastate population of Karner Blue Butterfly.
This Court has previously determined it has jurisdiction of
the case and that the Federal Circuit does not.
Therefore, it is hereby ordered that each of the parties brief all
of the following issues:
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1. Is the ESA a valid exercise of Congress’s Commerce power,
as applied to a wholly intrastate population of an endangered butterfly that would be eliminated by construction of
a single-family residence for personal use? (FWS argues
the ESA is a valid exercise of the Commerce power; Lear
and Brittain County argue it is not.)
2. Is Lear’s takings claim against FWS ripe without having applied for an ITP under ESA § 10, 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(1)(B)?
(Lear argues it is ripe; FWS and Brittain County argue it is
not.)
3. For takings analysis, is the relevant parcel the entirety of
Lear Island, or merely the Cordelia Lot as subdivided in
1965? (FWS and Brittain County argue the entire island is
the relevant parcel; Lear argues the Cordelia Lot is.)
4. Assuming the relevant parcel is the Cordelia Lot, does the
fact that the lot will become developable upon the natural
destruction of the butterfly habitat in ten years shield the
FWS and Brittain County from a takings claim based upon
a complete deprivation of economic value of the property?
(FWS and Brittain County argue the butterfly habitat’s
natural destruction in the future precludes Lear’s takings
claim; Lear argues it does not.)
5. Assuming the relevant parcel is the Cordelia Lot, does the
Brittain County Butterfly Society’s offer to pay $1,000 per
year in rent for wildlife viewing preclude a takings claim for
complete loss of economic value? (FWS and Brittain County
argue it does; Lear argues it does not.)
6. Assuming the relevant parcel is the Cordelia Lot, do public trust
principles inherent in title preclude Lear’s claim for a taking based
on the denial of a county wetlands permit? (FWS and Brittain
County argue public trust principles preclude Lear’s takings
claim; Lear argues they do not.)
7. Assuming the relevant parcel is the Cordelia Lot, are FWS
and Brittain County liable for a complete deprivation of the
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economic value of the Cordelia Lot when either the federal or
county regulation, by itself, would still allow development of
a single-family residence? (Lear argues that even though the
regulations would not individually amount to a taking under
Lucas, the ESA and the Brittain County Wetlands Preservation Law together completely deprive the Cordelia Lot of all
economic value; FWS and Brittain County argue that the
ESA and the Brittain County Wetlands Preservation Law
must be considered separately and thus do not completely deprive the Cordelia Lot of all economic value.)
SO ORDERED.
Entered this 1st day of September, 2016.
[NOTE: No decisions entered or documents dated after September
1, 2016 may be cited in briefs or oral arguments.]

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol8/iss1/1

4

2017]

NELMCC COMPETITION PROBLEM

5

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
DISTRICT OF NEW UNION
------------------------------------------------ X
CORDELIA LEAR,
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
v.
)
112-CV-2015-RNR
)
Decision and Judgment
UNITED STATES FISH AND )
WILDLIFE SERVICE,
)
Defendant,
)
)
and
)
)
BRITTAIN COUNTY, NEW
)
UNION
)
Defendant.
)
------------------------------------------------ X
This case involves the application of the Endangered Species
Act (“ESA”) and a municipal wetlands law to Plaintiff’s property
on Lear Island in Brittain County, New Union. Lear Island contains the last remaining habitat for the New Union subpopulation
of the Karner Blue Butterfly, a federally listed endangered species.
Plaintiff seeks to build a single-family house for her own use on her
irregularly shaped ten-acre property on Lear Island. Plaintiff challenges the constitutionality of the ESA as applied to her situation
and asserts a claim against both the Fish and Wildlife Service
(“FWS”) and Brittain County for an uncompensated taking of her
property under the Takings Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments.1

1. Lear waived any damages in excess of $10,000 in her takings claim against
the United States of America, allowing her to proceed with her claim in this Court.
See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(a)(2), 1491(a)(1); Chabal v. Reagan, 822 F.2d 349, 353 (3d
Cir. 1987); Shaw v. Gwatney, 795 F.2d 1351, 1356 (8th Cir. 1986); Goble v. Marsh,
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A seven-day bench trial was held before this Court. Based on
the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law set forth below, this
Court enters judgment: 1) dismissing Lear’s claim seeking a declaration that the ESA is an unconstitutional exercise of legislative
power as applied to her property; 2) awarding damages of $10,000
in Lear’s favor against the FWS for an unconstitutional taking of
her property in violation of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution; and 3) awarding damages in the amount of $90,000 against
Brittain County for an unconstitutional taking of Lear’s property
in violation of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. Lear Island is an island in Lake Union and is approximately two miles long and one mile wide, consisting of 1,000
acres. Lake Union is a large interstate lake, which has been traditionally used for interstate navigation. Lear Island was
granted to Cornelius Lear in 1803 by an Act of Congress. At the
time, present-day New Union was part of the Northwest Territory. The 1803 grant included title in fee simple absolute to all of
Lear Island and to “all lands under water within a 300-foot radius
of the shoreline of said island,” as well as an additional grant of
lands under water in the shallow strait separating Lear Island
from the mainland.
2. Cornelius Lear and his descendants have occupied Lear Island since the 1803 grant, using the island as a homestead, farm,
and hunting and fishing grounds. During the latter half of the
nineteenth century, the island was a productive farm, and produce
was carried by boat from the island to the mainland. The original
homestead is still located close to the north end of the island, near
the strait that separates the island from the mainland. In the early
twentieth century, the Lear Family constructed a causeway connecting the island to the mainland by road.
3. In 1965, King James Lear owned the entirety of the 1803
Lear Island grant. As part of an estate plan, King James Lear determined to divide Lear Island into three parcels, one for each of
his daughters Goneril, Regan, and Cordelia. The Brittain Town
Planning Board approved the subdivision of the property into three
684 F.2d 12, 15 (D.C. Cir. 1982). She did not waive damages in excess of $10,000
against Brittain County.
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lots: the 550-acre Goneril Lot, the 440-acre Regan Lot, and the 10acre Cordelia Lot2 At the time of the subdivision, the Brittain
Town Planning Board determined that each lot could be developed
in conformance with zoning requirements with at least one singlefamily residence. King James Lear then deeded each of the lots,
respectively, to his three daughters, reserving a life estate in each
lot for himself. Shortly after deeding the properties to his daughters, King James Lear constructed a residence on the Regan lot, for
use by his daughter Regan. He continued to live in the homestead,
located on the Goneril Lot.
4. King James Lear died in 2005, and each of the three daughters came into possession of their deeded properties. In 2012,
Plaintiff Cordelia Lear decided to build a residence on her lot.
5. The Cordelia Lot is situated at the northern tip of Lear Island. The lot consists of an access strip that is 40 feet wide by 1,000
feet long, and an open field that comprises the remaining nine
acres of uplands. In addition, there is about one acre of emergent
cattail marsh in a cove that historically was open water and was
historically used as a boat landing.
6. The nine-acre open field and access strip has been kept open
by annual mowing by the Lear Family for several decades. The family has referred to the Cordelia Lot as “The Heath” because it was
kept open, unlike the rest of the island, which naturally became
wooded after agricultural use of the island ceased in 1965. The Heath
was kept open by annual mowing each October.
7. The Heath and the access strip have become covered with
wild blue lupine flowers, which thrive in the sandy soil of Lear Island. Fields of wild blue lupines are essential for the survival of
Karner Blue larvae, which can only feed on the leaves of blue lupine plants. The ideal habitat for the Karner Blues consists of partially shaded lupine flowers near successional forests.
8. The Karner Blue is an endangered species. 50 C.F.R.
§ 17.11 (2015). It was added to the federal endangered species list
on December 14, 1992. 57 Fed. Reg. 59,236 (Dec. 14, 1992).
9. Although populations of Karner Blues survive in other
states, the only remaining population of the butterfly in New Union lives on the Heath on Lear Island. Karner Blues do not

2. The acreage figures do not include deeded lands underwater.
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migrate. Instead, eggs are laid in the fall, overwinter, and
hatch in the spring. A second brood hatches in the summer. Karner Blue larvae remain attached to lupine plant foliage until they
emerge from chrysalis as butterflies, and any disturbance of the
lupines during the larval and chrysalis stages would result in the
death of the butterflies. Karner Blue populations have difficulty
migrating to new habitats as their flight distance is short, and they
must follow woodland edge corridors. The New Union subpopulation of Karner Blue is entirely intrastate and does not travel across
any State boundaries.
10. The Heath, consisting of lupine fields adjacent to the successional forest on the Goneril lot, provides ideal habitat for the Karner
Blues, which thrives in partially shaded lupine fields. The access strip
provides particularly good partially shaded habitat for Karner Blues.
The Heath was designated by the FWS as critical habitat for the New
Union subpopulation of the Karner Blues in 1992.
11. In April 2012, Cordelia Lear contacted the New Union
FWS field office to inquire whether development of her property
would require any permits or approvals because of the existence of
the endangered butterfly population. FWS agent L.E. Pidopter advised Plaintiff that any disturbance of the lupine habitat in the
Heath other than continued annual mowing would constitute a
“take” of endangered butterfly. Pidopter also advised Plaintiff that
it was possible to obtain an Incidental Take Permit (“ITP”) under
section 10 of the ESA, but in order to file an application for such a
permit, Ms. Lear would have to develop a habitat conservation
plan (“HCP”) for the Karner Blues and an environmental assessment document under the National Environmental Policy Act. Pidopter advised Ms. Lear that in order to be approvable, an HCP
would have to provide for additional contiguous lupine habitat on
an acre-for-acre basis, including any disturbance of the access
strip. Pidopter also advised that an approvable HCP would require
a commitment to maintain the remaining lupine fields through annual fall mowing.
12. The only land that is contiguous to the Heath is the Goneril Lot. Cordelia Lear is estranged from her sister, and Goneril
Lear has refused to consider cooperating in any HCP that involves
restrictions on her property.
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13. Cordelia Lear investigated the cost of preparing the required HCP for the Karner Blues, and was advised by an environmental consultant that preparation of an application for an ITP,
including the required HCP and environmental assessment documents, would cost $150,000.
14. Following Cordelia Lear’s inquiry to the FWS, the FWS
New Union field office sent Cordelia Lear a letter on May 15, 2012
confirming that her entire ten-acre property was a critical habitat
for the Karner Blues and that any disturbance to the lupine fields
other than annual mowing during the month of October would constitute a “take” of the Karner Blues in violation of section 9 of the
ESA. The letter invited Plaintiff to submit an application for an
ITP and referred her to the FWS’s Habitat Conservation Planning
Handbook for information on how to develop an acceptable HCP to
submit with an ITP application. The FWS letter reiterated that an
acceptable HCP would require, at a minimum, that all acreage of
lupine field disturbed by development would have to be replaced
with contiguous acreage, and that the property owner would have
to commit to maintain the remaining and newly created lupine
fields by annual mowing each October.
15. Without annual mowing, the lupine fields on the Cordelia
Lot would naturally convert to a successional forest of oak and
hickory trees, eliminating the Karner Blues’ habitat. This process
would take about ten years. After ten years, this natural ecological
process would result in the extinction of the New Union subpopulation of the Karner Blues, unless a replacement habitat was created within a one-thousand-foot radius of the existing fields.
16. Rather than pursue an ITP application with the FWS, Plaintiff developed an alternative development proposal (“ADP”) that
would not disturb the lupine fields. In the ADP, Plaintiff proposed to
fill one half-acre of the marsh in the cove to create a lupine-free building site, together with an access causeway to provide access from the
shared mainland causeway without disturbing the access strip. As
the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers considers this portion of Lake Union to be “non-navigable” for purposes of the Rivers and Harbors Act
of 1899, and because construction of residential dwellings involving
one half-acre or less of fill is authorized by U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Nationwide Permit 29, see Issuance of Nationwide Permit for
Single-Family Housing, 60 Fed. Reg. 38,650 (July 27, 1995), no federal approvals would be required for this project.

9
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17. The ADP required a permit to fill the cove marsh, pursuant to the Brittain County Wetland Preservation Law, which was
enacted in 1982. In August 2013, Plaintiff duly filed a permit application with Brittain County Wetlands Board. The permit was
denied in December 2013, on the grounds that permits to fill wetlands would only be granted for a water-dependent use, and that a
residential home site was not a water-dependent use.
18. The fair market value of the Cordelia Lot without any restrictions that would prevent development of a single-family house
on the lot is $100,000. Property taxes on the Cordelia Lot are
$1,500 annually. There is no market in Brittain County for a parcel such as the Cordelia Lot for recreational use without the right
to develop a residence on the property, nor does the property have
any market in its current state as agricultural or timber land.
Plaintiff has not sought reassessment of her property following the
denial of the permit under the Brittain County Wetland Preservation Law. The Brittain County Butterfly Society has offered to pay
Cordelia Lear $1,000 annually for the privilege of conducting butterfly viewing outings during the summer Karner Blue season, but
she rejected the Society’s offer.
19. Plaintiff then commenced this action in February 2014,
seeking a declaration that the ESA was an unconstitutional exercise of congressional legislative power, or alternatively, seeking
just compensation from FWS and Brittain County for a regulatory
taking of her property.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. THE ESA IS A VALID EXERCISE OF CONGRESS’S
COMMERCE POWER.
Section 9 of the ESA prohibits the “take” of any endangered
species. See ESA § 9(a)(1)(B), 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(B). The term
“take” is defined by regulation to include “significant habitat modification or degradation where it actually kills or injures wildlife
by significantly impairing essential behavioral patterns, including
breeding, feeding or sheltering.” 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (2015). Citing
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), and United States v.
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000), Plaintiff argues that the ESA, by
prohibiting the “take” of an intrastate species, seeks to regulate noneconomic activities such as land clearing and vegetation removal.
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Lopez and Morrison reflect that, when relying on the substantial
aggregate effects of an activity on interstate commerce as the basis
for regulation under the Commerce power, U.S. Constitution art.
I, § 8, cl. 3, the relevant regulated activity must itself be economic
in nature. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 617. In Lopez, the Court
struck down the Gun-Free School Zones Act. See 514 U.S. at 561.
In Morrison, the Court struck down the Violence Against Women
Act, which made certain gender motivated acts of violence a federal
crime. See 529 U.S. at 617. In both cases, the Court held that
Congress lacked authority under the Commerce power to regulate
noneconomic activity.
Plaintiff argues that the prohibition against “taking” an intrastate species such as the Karner Blue, like gun possession and
rape, are noneconomic activities that cannot support the assertion
of legislative authority under the Commerce Clause. However, this
Court finds that the relevant activity is the underlying land development through construction of the proposed residence, and that
this activity is clearly an economic activity, involving as it does the
purchase of building materials and the hiring of carpenters and
contractors. Although the Twelfth Circuit has not addressed the
question, every court of appeals that has considered a Commerce
Clause challenge to the ESA “take” prohibition has upheld the Act.
This Court follows the weight of precedent and likewise holds that
the ESA prohibition against an unpermitted “take” of a wholly intrastate species is a valid exercise of the Commerce power. See
San Luis & Delta-Mendota Water Auth. v. Salazar, 638 F.3d 1163,
1177 (9th Cir. 2011); Alabama-Tombigbee Rivers Coal. v.
Kempthorne, 477 F.3d 1250, 1277 (11th Cir. 2007); Rancho Viejo,
LLC v. Norton, 323 F.3d 1062, 1069 (D.C. Cir. 2003); GDF Realty
Investments, Ltd. v. Norton, 326 F.3d 622, 640–41 (5th Cir. 2003);
Gibbs v. Babbitt, 214 F.3d 483, 505–06 (4th Cir. 2000); Nat’l Ass’n
of Home Builders v. Babbitt, 130 F.3d 1041, 1057 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
2. APPLICATION OF THE ESA INCIDENTAL TAKE
PROHIBITION AND THE BRITTAIN COUNTY
WETLANDS PRESERVATION LAW TO PLAINTIFF’S
PROPERTY HAS RESULTED IN AN UNCOMPENSATED
TAKING OF HER PROPERTY IN VIOLATION OF THE
FIFTH AMENDMENT.

11
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Plaintiff also asserts a takings claim against FWS and Brittain County. Citing Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505
U.S. 1003 (1992), Lear argues that the application of ESA and Brittain County Wetlands Preservation Law combine to deprive her of
any economic use of her property,3 and thus constitute a regulatory
“take” of her property requiring just compensation under the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments.
The Fifth Amendment to the Constitution provides that “nor
shall private property be taken for public use without just compensation.”4 This Court concludes that the combined application
of the ESA prohibition against “taking” the Karner Blue and
the Brittain County Wetlands Preservation Law have resulted in
the taking of Plaintiff’s property without compensation.
A. Plaintiff’s Takings Claim Against the FWS is Ripe for
Litigation.
Defendant FWS argues that Plaintiff’s takings claim is not
ripe, as Plaintiff never formally applied for an ITP, citing Morris v.
United States, 392 F.3d 1372, 1376–77 (Fed. Cir. 2004). However,
a takings claimant need not perform a futile act, when the government has already declared a policy of denying the very sort of permit the claimant would need. See Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533
U.S. 606, 626 (2001). Here, the FWS advised Plaintiff that any ITP
would of necessity include conditions that it would be impossible
for Plaintiff to satisfy. In addition, this Court finds that application for a permit would be futile where it is undisputed that the
cost of applying for a permit exceeds the fair market value of the
property in question. Pursuit of a permit is also unnecessary if a
Plaintiff can establish that “the procedure to acquire a permit is so
burdensome as to effectively deprive plaintiffs of their property
rights.” Hage v. United States, 35 Fed. Cl. 147, 164 (1996).5
3. Plaintiff does not advance a claim for a partial regulatory taking based on
the principles of Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 123–
28 (1978). See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency,
535 U.S. 302, 317–18 (2002); Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 216 F.3d 764, 773 (9th Cir. 2000), aff’d 535 U.S. 302.
4. The Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment has been incorporated against the states through the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause. See Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 239 (1897).
5. Although no party addressed the issue before this Court, this Court notes
that Plaintiff’s takings claim against Brittain County is similarly ripe, since the
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B. The Relevant Parcel for Takings Analysis is the Cordelia Lot, Not All of Lear Island.
FWS and Brittain County argue that the relevant parcel for
determining whether the ESA and Brittain County Wetlands
Preservation Law restrictions allow some residual economic use of
the lot should be the entire Lear Island, not just the Cordelia Lot.
In their view, since Cordelia Lear received her property as a gift
from her father, the relevant “investment backed expectations” for
the economic value of the property should be based on her ancestor’s acquisition of the entirety of Lear Island by congressional
grant in 1803. The Defendants argue that the Lear family, having
enjoyed and exploited the entirety of Lear Island for nearly two
centuries before subdividing it into three lots, cannot now claim
that it has been deprived of all economic value because one of those
lots has restrictions. They add that the Supreme Court has, in its
more recent takings cases, rejected so-called “conceptual severance” arguments that would apply a takings analysis to just one
portion of a combined property. See Tahoe-Sierra Preservation
Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 330
(2002) (rejecting claim based on current permissible uses of property separate from future permissible uses after moratorium expiration); Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S.
470, 500–01 (1987) (rejecting claim that “support estate” was distinct property for purpose of takings analysis of a Pennsylvania
law that prohibited mining of coal support pillars); Penn Cent.
Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 130–31 (1978) (rejecting claim that air rights were distinct from existing surface use
of property). FWS and Brittain County argue instead for a “flexible
approach” to determining the relevant parcel for takings analysis,
which takes into account the value of other lots in the same subdivision. See Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 28 F.3d 1171,
1181 (Fed. Cir. 1994); Deltona Corp. v. United States, 657 F.2d
1184, 1192 (Ct. Cl. 1981).
Whatever the merits of this flexible approach, this Court rejects the application of such an approach where ownership of the

Constitution of the State of New Union does not include a just compensation
clause nor do the State’s statutes provide a procedure for seeking just compensation. See Williamson Cnty. Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson
City, 473 U.S. 172, 194 (1985).

13
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relevant lots has been transferred to different parties. Formal subdivision of a property into separate lots should be determinative.
See Loveladies Harbor, 28 F.3d at 1181. There is no evidence that
the subdivision was undertaken as a subterfuge to create a takings
claim. Accordingly, the relevant parcel for takings analysis is the
Cordelia Lot.
C. The Relevant Time Period for Takings Analysis is the
Current Permissible Development of the Property.
Citing Tahoe–Sierra, Defendants FWS and Brittain County
argue that any restrictions on the Cordelia Lot should be considered temporary, since all Plaintiff would need to do is refrain from
mowing her fields and after ten years the natural processes of succession will result in the elimination of the Karner Blues’ habitat.
Although Tahoe–Sierra held that the imposition of a multiyear
building moratorium was not a complete deprivation of the economic value of the underlying property, see 535 U.S. at 332, this
Court finds the instant circumstances to be distinguishable. The
Tahoe–Sierra moratorium did not extend for an entire decade.
Moreover, this Court notes the irony of the FWS relying on the prospective extinction of the very subpopulation of Karner Blues it is
fighting to protect as an argument against finding a taking of
Plaintiff’s property. Accordingly, this Court concludes that the potential natural destruction of the Karner Blues’ habitat does not
preclude Plaintiff’s takings claim now.
D. Public Trust Limits on Uses of State Navigable Waters
Do Not Inhere in the Lear’s 1803 Congressional Grant
of Title.
Brittain County argues that it has no liability for a taking of
the Cordelia Lot, as the limits on filling and developing lands underwater are well-established public trust limits. Brittain County
relies on dicta in Lucas suggesting that, in limited circumstances,
compensation is not required for development limits that “inhere
in the title itself, in the restrictions that background principles of
the State’s law of property and nuisance already place upon land
ownership.” 505 U.S. at 1029. Brittain County argues that the
New Union’s interest in preserving navigation and protecting
other public trust interests in navigable waters constitutes such a
“background principle” of State law. However, Brittain County
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points to no applicable New Union precedent (and this Court has
been unable to locate any) establishing the scope of New Union’s
protections for public trust waters. Predicting how a New Union
court would rule on such matters is unnecessary, however, as this
Court finds that at the time of the 1803 grant to Cornelius Lear,
which included lands under water within 300 feet of the shoreline,
the United States did not recognize any public trust rights in nontidal navigable waters such as Lake Union. See P.P.L. Montana
L.L.C. v. Montana, 132 S. Ct. 1215, 1227 (2012) (collecting cases
suggesting the bed of non-tidal rivers were considered to be private
property prior to 1810). Thus, no public trust navigational reservation can be presumed to have existed at the time of the Lear
grant in 1803. Brittain County also argues that, under the “equal
footing doctrine,” the State of New Union must be presumed to
have taken title to lands under water on the same terms as the
thirteen original states. See id. at 1227–28. However, the equal
footing doctrine does not avail Brittain County, as a prior clear congressional grant gives superior title to the congressional grantee
as against a subsequent “equal footing” claim by a State. See
Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 57–58 (1894). Accordingly, the State
of New Union (and by extension Brittain County) cannot claim any
inherent public trust limits on the development of lands underwater that were part of the 1803 grant.
E. The Cordelia Lot Has Been Completely Deprived of All
Economic Value.
FWS and Brittain County make two arguments against finding that the ESA restrictions deprive the Cordelia Lot of all economic value. First, the Defendants argue that neither the ESA nor
any other federal regulation precludes development of a residence
in the cove area, together with a causeway for access. Similarly,
the Brittain County Wetlands Preservation Law does not prohibit
any development in the Heath. As a consequence, in Defendants’
view, neither regulation completely deprives the Cordelia Lot of all
economic value. Second, FWS and Brittain County argue that, in
any event, the willingness of the Brittain County Butterfly Society
to pay to run butterfly tours demonstrates that the property retains some economic value even if it cannot be developed. Neither
argument is persuasive.
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1) The Federal and Local Restrictions Must Be Combined to Consider Whether a Take Has Occurred.
FWS argues that because the ESA restrictions do not restrict
filling of the cove area and development of a residence there (nor
does any other federal regulation), the Cordelia Lot has not been
completely deprivedof all economic value of by the FWS. See Palazollo, 533 U.S. at 631 (holding the existence of developable uplands
can defeat a takings claim based on wetlands regulations affecting
most, but not all, of property). It is questionable whether the Palazollo holding even applies where the unrestricted “land” is all actually under water and cannot be developed without fill. However,
in this case, unlike Palazollo, the non-federally restricted portion
of the property cannot be developed, because of the existence of local restrictions. For its part, Brittain County makes the reciprocal
argument that the Wetlands Preservation Law does not prohibit
any construction in the causeway and Heath.
This case presents the apparently novel question of whether a
property owner can make a claim for a complete deprivation of economic value of a lot where federal regulations restrict one part of
the property and local municipal regulations restrict another part.
Accepting FWS’s and Brittain County’s arguments would mean
that a property owner deprived of all economic use of their property
would be denied recourse, as the federal government and local government each claim that their own regulation, by itself, leaves
some developable portion. This situation is not unlike the case of
a joint tort, where neither actor acting alone causes a harm, but
both actors acting together cause a harm. The prevailing rule is
that, in such a case, where the harm is indivisible, each tortfeasor
is jointly and severally liable to the plaintiff. See Velsicol Chem.
Corp. v. Rowe, 543 S.W.2d 337 (Tenn. 1976). Accordingly, both
FWS and Brittain County are jointly and severally liable for any
taking of Plaintiff’s property.
2) Plaintiff Has Been Deprived of All Economic Use of
Her Property.
The Supreme Court established in Lucas that where government regulation leaves a property owner with no economically remunerative use of their property, a compensable taking has occurred without regard to balancing any public interests served by
the regulation. The Defendants argue that Plaintiff is not without

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol8/iss1/1

16

2017]

NELMCC COMPETITION PROBLEM

17

economically remunerative use of the property, as the Brittain
County Butterfly Society has offered to pay Plaintiff $1,000 annually for the privilege of conducting tours on the property. This is
less than the amount of annual property taxes on the lot. A piece
of real property that incurs more in property taxes than it can generate in income is by definition without economic value. Accordingly, Plaintiff has been deprived of all economic use of her property and is entitled to compensation from the FWS and Brittain
County.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, judgment is hereby entered as follows:
1) Awarding Plaintiff $10,000 damages against defendant
United States Fish and Wildlife Service;
2) Awarding Plaintiff $90,000 damages against defendant
Brittain County; and
3) Dismissing Plaintiff’s claim for declaratory judgment declaring the ESA unconstitutional as applied to her property.
So entered:
/s/ Romulus N. Remus
Romulus N. Remus
U.S.D.J.
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